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LIABILITY OF A PRINCIPAL FOR THE FRAUDS OF HIS AGENT.

In an English case which has come to be regarded as
classical authority,

Willes, J.,

said :

"The master is

answerable for every such wrong of the servant or agent
as is committed in the course of the service, and for the
master's benefit." I

This is a concise and frequently quoted

expression of the general rule of vicarious liability : a
rule which was enunciated by Lord Holt in the early case of
Hem v. Nichols, (1709) 1 Salk. 289, and is now firmly intrenched in the law.

The precise limits of the rule, how-

ever, especially in its application to cases of fraud, are
not clear.

Indeed, their determination presents some inter-

esting and difficult problems, the intelligent solution of
which demands a study of the doctrine as a whole, and of the
theory upon which it rests.
'Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259, 265.
1t Tas been sal tat the rule was introduced in the case
of Michael v. Alestree, 2 Lev. 172, but it is at best doubtful upon what ground the decision in that case rests.

The rule is clearly an anomalous one.

Under its opera-

tion, a person is compelled to answer not only for his own
wrongs, but for wrongs of which he is entirely innocent ;
for which, indeed, another is morally and legally answerable.
This is not a fatal objection, however, for experience rather
than logic is the life of our law, and history affords the
true test of expediency.

The origin of the rule is obscure.

Judge Holmes, in his treatise on 'The Common Law " , attributes it to the jurisprudence of Rome.

When a slave com-

mitted a wrong, his master, in order that the desire for
vengeance might be satisfied, was compelled to forfeit him
to the person injured, that he might do with him as he liked.
In time, the master was granted the privilege of buying off
the vengeance by agreement, of paying the damages instead of
surrendering the slave, and with the advance of civilization this became the general custom.
startling innovation.

Then followed a more

It was held that inn-keepers and

ship-owners should be responsible for the wrongs of those
in their employ, even though the wrong-doer was a free man,
and therefore himself legally answerable for his wrong.
Although in reality resting on grounds of public policy

1pp. 15. 16.

alone, the jurists explained this extension of the doctrine
of vicarious liability on the theory that the inn-keeper
or ship-owner is negligent in employing such servants --a theory which applies with equal force to every form of
employment.

That the reason is unsound is shown by the

fact that no amount of care or vigilance in the selection
of his servants will save the master from liability.

Yet

the principle thus introduced by the praetor in an exceptional
case has become the general rule of law in both England and
America, and is applied as well to the relation of principal
and agent as to that, of master and servant.
Conceding then, that the reason for the origin of the
rule is irrational, can there not be found a more satisfactory reason for its maintenance ?

For it may be said

that notwithstanding the hardships which occasionally accompany its application, the rule is universally regarded as a
just one.

Is it then merely a survival of ancient tradition,

or may it be reconciled to kiodern legal conceptions ?

Judge

Holmes contends, and with considerable force, that the rule
rests to-day entirely upon the fiction of identity ---

that

the act of the servant is the act of the master ; and cannot
be resolved into an application of general and accepted principles.

The same view is taken in the leading English case

of Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, where Littledale,J.
says

"The servant represents the master himself and their

acts stand upon the same footing as his own."
in Sharrod v. London

Baron Parke,

& N. W. Ry. Co., 4 Ex. 580, 585, fol-

lows the old fallacy of the Roman jurists, that the master
is liable because he employs negligent servants.

And Lord

Brougham declared, in Duncan v. Findlater, 6 C1. & Fin. 910,
that the reason for holding the master is that by employing
the servant-he set the whole thing in motion and is responsible for the consequences.

Still others have suggested that

the rule in reality rests on the theory that public policy
demands that there should be some responsible person who
can be relied upon to pay the damages.

But all of these

reasons are far from satisfactory, and it is a pleasure to
find that an American judge, Mr. Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, as early as in 1842,
sound and rational basis.

placed the rule upon a

In the leading case of Farwell

v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Co., he said :

"This rule

is obviously founded on the great principle of social duty,
that every man, in the management of his own affairs, whether
by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct

'(1842)

4 Met.

(Mass.)

49.

them as not to injure another ;
another thereby sustains damages,

and if he does not, and
he shall answer for it."

These words are quoted with approval by such a distinguished
authority as Sir Frederick Pollock, who, in his "Essays on
Jurisprudence and Ethios" I, discusses the subject with perspicuity and force.

"An employer's liability to strangers for

the acts and defaults of his servants", he says, 'does not
stand alone in being a duty extending beyond acts and events
under the direct control of the person liable.
wide or wider are imposed in other cases.

Duties as

Is there any

common element present, in all these cases in which a reasonable ground of liability may be discussed ?

There seems to

be this common point in all of them, that a man has for his
own convenience brought about or maintained some state of
things which in the ordinary course of nature may work mischief to his neighbors.

Whether his property be cattle

grazing in his field or water stored in a reservoir, or a
structure crossing or overhanging a public road, there is
a certain risk to adjoining owners or to the public which
necessarily accompanies the state of things so kept up.

It

is an intelligible principle that whoever thus exposes others

I pp.

to risk should abide the consequences if the risk ripens
into actual harm.

.0.

.

.

.

A man's undertaking or busi-

ness is his property in a broad sense of the word.

The

vehicles, plant, machinery or other effects with which he
carries it on are his property in a strict sense.

And by

analogy to the cases we have already considered, the use of
this property, so far as it entails any risk upon the public, must carry with it a proportionate duty."

This duty,

he concludes, is that reasonable care should be used in the
conduct of his business, whether by himself or by his servants or agents.
It is believed, as was intimated before, that this broad
principle furnishes a rational and satisfactory reason for
the maintenance of the rule.

It is certainly the only prin-

ciple by which its existence can be justified, and should
therefore be the true test by which to define the limits of
its application.

Keeping it, as a guide, clearly before

us, let us turn to the study of some of the leading decisions which have to do with the fraudulent, acts and representations of agents, and determine, if possible, how far
in that direction the rule of vicarious liability should be
carried.

Frauds of Agent.

The fraud of an agent may be either
(1) An Authorized Fraud, including one which although
unauthorized when committed is subsequently ratified by the
principal ;

or

(2) An Unauthorized Fraud.

Authorized Fraud.

It is perfectly plain that for frauds committed by his
direction and authority, the principal is answerable.

In-

deed, this is such a clear and simple proposition of law,
that authority is hardly needed to support it.
per alium, facit per se.

Qui facit

The agent is merely an instrument

in the hand of the principal, and his act is in reality that
of the principal himself.

The liability of the principal

is not a vicarious liability, but a liability for his own
wrong, and the person injured has all the remedies contractual and in tort to which he would be entitled if the principal had committed the wrong personally.

The same is true,

of course, where the tort, although unauthorized when committed, is subsequently ratified by the principal.

It should

be noted in this connection, however, that the principal is
not bound by his ratification of a tort, unless such tort
was committed in his name and on his behalf.

If the wrong

was committed by the agent in his own name, or on behalf of
a third person, it cannot be effectually adopted by the
principal.

Unauthorized Fraud.

It is with this class of fraud that the difficulty is
encountered.

In the first place, the rule is well estab-

lished, that in order to bind the principal, the fraud must
have been committed by the agent while acting within the
general scope of his employment.
tion is apparent.

The reason for this limita-

Every one, as has been seen, is responsi-

ble for the conduct of his own business and property, whether
by himself or his agents.

But when an agent steps outside

the limits of his general employment, he ceases to be an
agent, even in the eye of the world, and though he may pretend
to act in that capacity, he cannot bind his principal any

more effectually than a person who has no authority from the
principal at, all --- indeed, who is an entire stranger to
him.

The difficulty is therefore resolved to these terms.

Under what circumstances is the principal liable for the
fraud of his agent, committed while acting within the scope
of his employment, but without the principal's knowledge or
consent ?

This problem must be considered with reference

to two quite distinct and essentially different states of
fact.

These are :
(1) Vhere the fraud is committed for the benefit of

the principal.
(2)

Where the fraud is committed for the benefit, of

the agent.

Fraud for Benefit of Principal.

In the case where the fraud is committed for the benefit
of the principal,
swerable.

it, is generally conceded that he is an-

Indeed the first reported case on the general

rule of vicarious liability, Hem v. Nichols, supra, was one
of this nature.

The action was for deceit, the plaintiff

setting forth that, he bought several parcels of silk of the

defendant, as silk of a certain make, whereas it was in
reality another kind of silk.

At the trial it appeared

that there was no actual deceit in the defendant, who was
the merchant, but that it was in his factor beyond sea, and
the question was raised whether the merchant could be charged
with the deceit.

Lord Holt held that the merchant was

liable civiliter for the deceit of his factor : for seeing
somebody must be a loser by this deceit, he was of opinion
that it was more reasonable that he who employed and put
trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser than
a stranger.

This judgment seems to have been followed in

several other early cases' and also in the comparatively
recent one of Udell v. Atherton, (1862 ;

7 H. & N. 172)

where the court was evenly divided upon another point.

But

the ruling case in England to-day is that, of Barwick v.
English Joint Stock Bank, already mentioned.

The action was

brought for an alleged fraud, which was described in the
pleadings as being the fraud of the bank, but which the
plaintiff alleged to have been committed by the manager of
the bank in the course of its business.

At the trial it

See Grammar v. Nixon, 1 Stra. 653 (1739) ; Alexander
Moens
v. Gibson, 2 Camp.-b5-(1811) afterwards overruTedf
v. Heyworth, 10 M. & W. 157 (1842).

was proved that Barwick, the plaintiff, had been in the
habit of supplying oats to a customer of the bank, of the
name of Davis ; that he had done so upon a guaranty given
to him by the bank through its manager ; that he became
dissatisfied with his guaranty and refused to supply more
oats without a more satisfactory one ; and that the manager
induced him to continue by giving him a new guaranty, which
last guaranty was alleged to be fraudulent.

It was held

that if the guaranty were fraudulent, the bank would be
liable.

The opinion of the court on the point, however,

is brief and dogmatic, and since we have already quoted the
vital sentences, it is unnecessary to dwell upon it.
The English courts seem to have recognized one exception
to this rule.

If the agent of a corporation induce sub-

scribers by fraudulent representations to purchase stock in
the corporation, it is said that the subscriber cannot have
an action for deceit against the corporation, but must seek
his remedy by rescission of the contract.

The earliest

authority for this exception is the case of Western Bank of
Scotland v. Addie, L. R. 1 H. L. (Sc.) 145, which was decided
at about the same time as Barwick's case.

Addie alleged

that he had been induced to take shares in the Western Bank
of Scotland by the fraudulent representations of its direct-

ors, and claimed to recover the value of his shares or to
be reimbursed the damages which he had sustained.

After his

purchase of the shares and before he instituted the suit,
the bank, which had been an unincorporated company, was with
his concurrence incorporated, and registered, for the purpose
of being wound up.

Upon these facts it was held that Addie

had no action for deceit against the newly formed corporation.

The opinions of the judges, however, are not as

clear as might be desired, and it is difficult to determine
the precise reason for the decision.

In Mackay v. Commer-

cial Bank of New Brunswick (1874) L. R. 5 P. C. App. 394,
a case which follows Barwick's case, Sir Montague Smith,
referring to Addie's case, expresses the opinion that it
does not constitute a real exception to the rule, but was
decided upon special grounds.

And in support of his view

he quotes the opinion of Lord Cranworth :

"He (Addie) was

a party to a proceeding whereby the company from which the
purchase was made was put an end to ---

it

ceased to be

unincorporated, and became an incorporated company, with
many statutable incidents connected with it, which did not
exist before the incorporation.
in the course of being wound up.
late ;

The new company is now
.

. . 0

.

He comes too

the appellants are not the persons who were guilty

of the fraud, and although the unincorporated company is
by the express provisions under which it was incorporated
made liable for the debts and liabilities incurred before
the incorporation, I cannot read the statute as transferring
to the unincorporated company a liability to be sued for
frauds or other wrongful acts committed by the directors
before incorporation."

But in the later case of Houlds-

worth v. City of Glasgow Bank, (1880) L. R. 5 App. Cas. 317,
the decision in Addie's case seems to have been considered
as creating a real exception to the rule, for it is expressly
followed, even though under a state of facts to which the
reasoning of Lord Cranworth, quoted above, is entirely inIndeed Lord Selborne, in referring to the

applicable.

opinion of Lord Cranworth, says :

"One expression, indeed,

of Lord Cranworth in that part of his judgment which relates
to the question of damages ("He comes too late " ), might
possibly, if it were not qualified by the subsequent context, have been taken to mean that even if the unregistered
company had been liable to be sued for damages, by its public officer, down to the time of registration, that liability would not have been among the "debts and obligations"
transferred

....

• to the registered company.

Lord

Cranworth was, I think, too good a lawyer and too accurate

a thinker to have placed any such narrow (I had almost said
unreasonable) construction upon such words in such a statute.

He made, to my mind, his real neaning plain by what

he went, on to say ; from which it is apparent that if the
western bank had been incorporated before, and not after,
the frauds then in question the corporation would not, in
his opinion, have been liable for those frauds in an action
of this kind for damages."

The ground upon which the excep-

tion to the rule in this class of cases rests is clearly
stated by Lord Selborne, as follows : "This is not a case
of parties at arm's length with each other, one of whom has
suffered a wrong of which damages are the simple and proper
measure, and which may be redressed by damages without any
unjust or inconsistent consequences.

For many purposes

a corporation with whom his own corporation has dealings,
or on whom it may by its agents inflict some wrong, is in
the same position towards it as a stranger ; except that
he may have to contribute ratably
payment of his own claim.

with others towards the

But here it is impossible to

separate the matter of the Pursuer's claim from his status
as a corporator, unless that status can be put an end to by
rescinding the contract which brought him into it.

His

complaint is, that, by means of the fraud alleged he was

induced to take upon himself the liabilities of a shareholder.

The loss from which he seeks to be indemnified by

damages is really neither more nor less than the whole aliquot share due from him in contribution of the whole debts and
liabilities of the company ; and if his claim is right in
principle, I fail to see how the remedy founded on that
principle can stop short of going this length.

But it is

of the essence of the contract between the shareholders (as
long as it

remains unrescinded) that they should all con-

tribute equally to the payment of all the company's debts
and liabilities.

Such an action of damages as the present

is really not against the corporation as an aggregate body,
but it is against all the members of it except one, viz,
the Pursuer ;

it

is to throw upon them the Pursuer's share

of the corporate debts and liabilities.

Many of those

shareholders (as was observed by Lord Cranworth in Addie's
case) may have come,

and probably did come into the company

after the Pursuer had acquired his shares.

They are all

as innocent of the fraud as the Pursuer himself ; if it were
imputable to them, it must, on the same principle, be imputable to the Pursuer himself so long as he remains a
shareholder ; and they are no mre liable for any consequences of fraudulent or other wrongful acts of the company's

agent than he is.

Rescission of the contract in such a

case is the only remedy for which there is any precedent,
amd it is in my opinion the only way in which the company
could justly be made answerable for a fraud of this kind."
A few of our American courts, apparently misled by the
English cases of Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, and
Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, end assuming the exception recognized in them to be the general rule, have denied
altogether that an action of deceit will lie against an
innocent principal for the fraud of his agent, even though
committed in the course of his employment and for the principal's benefit.

The leading case is that of Kennedy v.

McKay and others, 43 N. J. L. 288, decided in 1881.

The

action was based upon an alleged fraud committed by the
defendant McKay, in the sale to the plaintiff of forty shares
of the stock of the State Insurance Company.

The deceit

consisted in unfounded representations as to the financial
condition of the company.

The stock at the time of the

sale was standing on the corporation books in the name of
McKay, and the sale was effected by the two other defendants,
acting as his agents.

McKay, however, neither authorized

nor was privy in any way to the utterance by them of the
false representations in question.

Mr. Chief Justice Beasley

quotes from the opinions in Addie's case at some length,
and says : "In the light of such authorities it is clear
that an innocent vendor cannot be sued in tort for the fraud
of his agent in effecting a sale.

In such a juncture the

aggrieved vendee has, at law, two, and only two remedies ;
the first being a rescission of the contract of sale and a
reclamation of the money paid by him from the vendors, or
a suit against the agent, founded on the deceit.

But in

such a posture of affairs, a suit based on the fraud will
not lie against the innocent vendor, on account of the deceit
practiced without his authority or knowledge by his agent. "'
The weight of American authority, however, sanctions
the rule as laid down in Barwick's case.

A frequently

cited authority is the New York case of Jeffrey v. Bigelow,
13 Wend. 518, decided as early as in 1835.

It appeared

that the defendant's agent, duly authorized to sell a flock
of sheep, fraudulently sold to the plaintiff a portion of
the flock, knowing at the time that they were diseased.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the defendant
was liable in damages for the fraud of his agent.

In

Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co. (1877), 77 N. C. 233, the
ISee also Herring v. SkWs, 62 Ala. 180.

principal was a corporation, and the court expressly followed
Barwick's case.

"There is no reason that occurs to us',

says

the court, "why a different rule should be applicable to
cases of deceit from what applies in other torts.

A corpora-

tion can only act through its agents, and must be responsible for their acts.
that it should be so.

It is of the greatest public importance
If a manufacturing and trading cor-

poration is not responsible for the false and fraudulent
representations of its agents, those who deal with it will
be practically without redress, and the corporation can commit fraud with impunity."

And in Haskell v. Starbird (1890)

152 Mass. 117, it was declared that there is no distinction in
the matter of responsibility for fraud between an agent authorized to do business generally and an agent employed to conduct a single transaction, if, in each case, he is acting in
the business for which he was employed by the principal and
had full authority to complete the transaction.-

'See also : Busch v. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 315 ; s. c. 336
Griswold v. Gebbie: 126 Pa.T. 353
Lynch v. Mercantile
Trust Co'., 1B'Fe. Rep. 486 ; Wolfe v.
h, 10Iin.
;
Rhoia T. Annis, 75 Me. 17 ; Nichols v. asworth, 40 Minn.
4,7; DuiSonchet v. Dutcher, 11 In.
24 ; Dafvies v. Lyon,
36 Minn. 47FTocke v. tearns, 1 Metc. 560 T--te v.
Sawyer; 16 Gray URT-- Sanirorc v. Handy, 23 Wend.=
;
Tennettv. Judson, 21 N. Y. 237 ; Dur
v. Burton, 47 N. Y.
167 ; Reynods v. Witte, 13 S. C. .-

There are some cases which indicate a tendency to
restrict the recovery, in the action against the principal,
to the amount of the benefit derived by the principal from
the fraud.

This carries logically the corollary that the

principal may rescind the contract, if by so doing he can
place the person defrauded in as good a position as he was
before.

But if he cannot or does not rescind, he must pay

the person defrauded the amount which he holds as the fruit
of the fraud!

The weight of both reason and authority,

however, permits a recovery to the full extent of the damage'

Fraud for Benefit of Agent.

It has been seen that the courts are fairly in accord
in regard to cases of fraud committed by an agent for the
benefit of his principal.

As to the liability of the prin-

cipal for fraud committed under cover of the principal's
business, but for the benefit of the agent, the decisions

1Judson

v. Bennett, 21 N. Y. 238 ; Krumm v. Beach, 99
N. 2Y ; Fairchild v. McMvion, 139 N-. Y 290'."
Jeffrey v. B Tgelow7, 13 WeT7[8 ; White v. Sawyer, 16
GrayF5RT ; Surrev. Francis, 3 App. Ca.7716.

are by no means so harmonious.
In the admirable statement of the general rule which
has already been quoted from the opinion of Willes, J.,

in

Barwick's case, it is apparent that in England the principal
is only responsible for frauds committed for his benefit.
And in the case of British Mutual Banking Company v. Charmwood Forest Railway Company, (1887) L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 714,
it is expressly so held.
clear.

In America the point is not so

The United States Supreme Court holds the same

view as do the courts of England, but in many of the States
a contrary rule is as strenuously maintained.

The prin-

cipal, say these courts, impliedly warrants the fidelity
of his agent in the exercise of his apparent authority.
In the words of the learned Story,. "The principal holds
out his agent as competent and fit to be trusted, and thereby, in effect, he warrants his fidelity and good conduct
in all matters within the scope of the agency."

Thus, if

the agent is a general agent in the sense that his powers
are fixed by custom, a person dealing in good faith with
such agent may assume that the agent has the power commonly
exercised by such agents, and hold the principal liable for

I Story on Agency (9th Ed.)

Sec. 452.

Boston Railroad, (1889) 150 Mass. 200, declared it to be the
general rule that a corporation is estopped to deny the
validity of certificates issued in proper form under its
seal, and duly signed by the officers authorized to issue
certificates, if they are held by persons who took them for
value without knowledge or notice that they had been fraudulently issued.
(1890)

150 Mass.

But in Farrington v. South Boston Railroad,
406, decided about a month later, it

was

held that, a person who accepts a certificate of stock from
an agent of a corporation in pledge for the payment of money
borrowed for such agent's personal benefit, without inquiring into its validity, and relying entirely upon the agent's
representations, is not an innocent holder, and cannot bind
the corporation.

In issuing such a certificate, argues

the court, the agent has a personal interest adverse to that
of the corporation, and consequently a third person should
reasonably be required to investigate his title.

The Feder-

al case of Moores v. Citizens National Bank, to which we
have already referred, arose under similar circumstances,
and at least in the Circuit Court, was decided upon the same
grounds.

"The plaintiff having had knowledge of the fact",

15 Fed. Rep. 141.

acts within such apparent power.

This is merely an appli-

cation of the doctrine of estoppel in pais., commonly stated
in this form :

"When one of two innocent, parties must suf-

fer, he must bear the loss who reposed the confidence."
The difference of opinion is strikingly iillustrated
in cases where the agent, under cover of his principal's
business, issues for his own benefit fraudulent documents
of title, such as certificates of stock, bills of lading
or

warehouse receipts.

In British Mutual Banking Company

v. Charmwood Forest Railway Company, (supra),

the defendant's

agent fraudulently issued certificates for debenture stock
in excess of the amount which the company was authorized
to issue, and subsequently made false representations to
the plaintiff's manager as to the validity of the transfers
of such stock.

As a result the plaintiffs made a loan upon

the security of the fraudulently issued stock, and suffered
the damages for which the action was brought.

It appeared

that the defendant did not benefit in any way by the false
statements of their agent, which were made entirely in his
own interest.

Bowen, L. J., quoted with approval the rule

in Barwick's case,

and Lord Esher said :

"Although what the

secretary stated related to matters about which he was authorized to give answers, he did not make the statements for

the defendants but for himself.

He had a friend whom he

desired to assist and could assist by making the false statements, and as he made them in his own interest or to assist
his friend, he was not acting for the defendants.

The rule

has often been expressed in the terms that to bind the principal, the agent must be acting 'for the benefit' of the
principal.

This, in my opinion, is equivalent to saying

that he must be acting 'for' the principal, since if there
is authority to do the act it does not matter if the principal is benefitted by it."

The Supreme Court case of

Moores v. Citizens National Bank, (1883) 111 U. S. 156, has
been regarded as authority for the same view, though the
decision was apparently governed by special circumstances.
On the other hand there are decisions in several States,
distinctly holding that if a stock-transfer agent, having
general authority to issue stock certificates, issue fictitious certificates for his own benefit, the defrauded
purchaser has an action for deceit against the corporation.
The ruling case of New York & New Haven Railroad Company
v. Schuyler, (1865) 34 N. Y. 30, arose out of the so-called
"Schuyler Frauds."

Robert Schuyler, the president and

general transfer agent of the plaintiff company, who had
general authority to issue stock, issued, beyond the capital

limited by its charter, but in the form prescribed by its
by-laws and purporting to be transferable on its books on
surrender of the certificates, a large number of certificates
of stock.

The case was remarkable for the number and dis-

tinction of counsel, and it was argued, says the court, "with
an elaboration and power seldom equalled in a court of
justice."

In the course of his long and exhaustive opinion,

Davis, J., speaking for an unanimous court, says : "I have
come to the conclusion that the issuing of the certificates
by him must be held to be within the scope of the real and
apparent authority which he possessed ; and the remedy of
the defendants is not prejudiced by the fact that he used
and intended to use the avails for his own purposes."

And

in the recent New York case of Fifth Ave. Bank v. Ferry
Railroad Comany, (1893) 137 N. Y. 231, Judge Maynard, speaking of a fraudulently issued certificate of stock, said :
"It was a certificate apparently made in the course of his
employment as the agent of the company and within the scope
of the general authority conferred upon him, and the defendant
is under an implied obligation to make indemnity to the
plaintiff for the loss sustained by the negligent or wrongful exercise by its officers of the general powers conferred
upon them."

The Massachusetts court, in Allen v. South

says the court, "that Moores, upon whom she relied to have
the stock transferred to her, was acting for himself as well
as in his capacity of cashier --- that is, acting for the
bank upon one side and for himself on the other, in reference
to the matter of issuing this certificate --- she is not,
in the judgment of this court, an innocent holder of the
stock."

However, in Tome v. Parkersburg Branch Railroad

CompanY, (1873) 39 Md. 36, another case in which the treasurer pledged fraudulently issued stock as security for payment of a loan to him, the corporation was held liable.
"The ground of liability", the court points out, "is not
that the principal has been benefited by the act of the
agent, but that an innocent third person has been damaged
by confiding in the agent, who was accredited by the principal, as worthy of trust, in that particular business."
In respect to the fraudulent issue of bills of lading,
the ruling English authority is Grant v. Norway, (1851)
10 C. B. 665, where it was held that the owner of a ship
is not bound by the fraudulent act of the ship's master, in
signing a bill of lading for goods which had never been
shipped.

The court contends that the master is a general

agent with authority to perform all things usual in his
employment,

and since it

is not usual for masters to sign

fictitious bills of lading, such an act is not within the
general scope of his employment.

This argument is a mere

play upon words and if carried to its logical conclusion
would excuse every excess of duty on the part of an agent.
That it is not accepted, even by the English courts, is
shown by the decision in Montaignae v. Shitta, (1890) 15
App. Cas. 357, to the effect that where an agent is authorized to borrow money for the purpose of carrying on the
business entrusted to him, which authority under circumstances of emergency must be deemed to include power to
borrow on exceptional terms outside the ordinary course of
business, the lender is not bound to inquire whether in the
particular case the emergency had arisen or not, but is
entitled to recover from the principal if he made the loan
in good faith and without notice that the agent was exceeding his authority.

The fallacious reasoning in Grant v.

Norway has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court
and steadily followed in the Federal tribunals.

In the

case of The Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, (1855) 18 How.
182, the Supreme Court said :

"The master of a vessel has

no more apparent authority to sign bills of lading than he
has to sign bills of sale of the ship.

He has an apparent

authority, if the ship be a general one, to sign bills of

lading for cargo actually shipped and he has also authority
to sign a bill of sale of the ship when, in case of disaster,
his power of sale arises.

But the authority in each case

arises out of and depends upon a particular state of facts.
It is not an unlimited authority in the one case more than
in the other, and his act, in either case, does not bind the
owner, when in favor of an innocent purchaser, if the facts
upon which his power depended did not exist, and it is inuimbent upon those who are about to change their condition
upon the faith of his authority to ascertain the existence
of all the facts upon which his authority depends."

And

in Pollard v. Vinton, (1881) 105 U. S. 7, the court, quoting
at length the opinion in the foregoing case, distinctly
holds that neither the master of a steamboat, nor its shipping agents at points on the rivers of the interior where
cargo is received and delivered, can, by giving a bill of
lading for goods not received for shipment, bind the vessel
or its cargo.

The same doctrine also prevails in several

of the State courts, including those of Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, Maryland, Louisiana, Missouri and North Carolina.
In many jurisdictions, however, a contrary rule has been
firmly established, resting upon the doctrine of estoppel
in pais.

Perhaps the leading authority is Armour v. Mich.

Cent. Rd. Co. (1875) 65 N. Y. 111.

In this case Grant v.

Norway is expressly disapproved and the defendant carrier
is held liable to bona fide holders, upon bills of lading
issued by its agent who had been deceived by forged warehouse receipts ; the decision resting upon the ground that
as the agent was acting within the scope of his authority
in issuing bills of lading, the carrier was estopped to deny
the validity of his act.
Rd. Co.,

So, in Brooke v. N. Y. L. E. & W.

(1885) 108 Pa. St. 529, the carrier was held liable,

where the agent by collusion with a shipper issued fictitious bills of lading, which passed into the hands of innocent purchasers.

This case was decided according to the

laws of New York, the contractual rights of the parties
having arisen in that State ;

but, as Mr. Porter at Sec.

434 of his treatise on the Law of Bills of Lading observes,
the Pennsylvania court regarded the lex loci contractus
with such clearly expressed approval as to render the adoption of it as the lex fori, when occasion may be presented,
highly probable.
Another interesting case in support of the view that
the principal is liable, even though the fraud is committed
for the agent's benefit, is that of McCord v. Western Union
Telegraph Co. (1888) 39 Minn. 181.

The local agent of the

company, who was also agent of an express company at the
same place, sent, a forged dispatch to a merchant in a neighboring city, requesting him to forward money to his correspondent at the former place, to use in buying grain.

The

telegram was duly received, and the money in good faith
forwarded by express in response, but it was intercepted
and converted to his own use by the agent.

The court held

that notwithstanding the agent had committed the fraud for
his own benefit, the company was answerable in damages to
the person defrauded.

"The rule which fastens a liability

upon the master to third persons for the wrongful and unauthorized acts of his servant", says Vanderburgh, J.,

"is

not confined solely to that class of cases where the acts
complained of are done in the course of the employment in
furtherance of the master's business or interest.

..

..

The defendant selected its agent, placed him in oharge of
its business at the station in question, and authorized him
to send messages over its line.

Persons receiving dis-

patches in the usual course of business, when there is nothing to excite suspicion, are entitled to rely upon the presumption that the agents entrusted with the performance of
the business of the company have faithfully and honestly
discharged the duty owed by it to its patrons, and that they

would not knowingly send a false or forged message ;

and

it would ordinarily be an unreasonable and impracticable
rule to require the receiver of a dispatch to investigate
the question of the integrity and fidelity of the defendant's
agents in the performance of their duties before actingWhether the agent is unfaithful to his trust, or violates
his duty to, or disobeys the instructions of, the company,
its patrons have no means of knowing.

If the corporation

fails in the performance of its dt.ty through the neglect
or fraud of the agent whom it has delegated to perform it,
the master is responsible.

It was the business of the

agent to send dispatches of a similar character, and such
adts were within the scope of his employment, and the plaintiff could not, know the circumstances that, made the particular act vrongful and unauthorized.

As to him, therefore,

it must be deemed the act of the corporation. "
Authorities might be multiplied, but we deem those
already discussed sufficient to disclose the nature of the
conflict and the tendency of judicial opinion in regard to
it.

The cases may seem irreconcilable, but upon reason,

at least, it seems clear that a principal should be answerable for all acts of his agent within the scope of his real
or apparent, authority, whether or not such act is committed

in the interest and for the benefit of the principal.

The

doctrine of estoppel in pais is an eminently just and reasonable one.

In any event, some one must suffer from the

fraud of the agent, and since the principal, by reposing
confidence,

made it

possible for him to commit it,

and more-

over is in the better position to judge of fidelity in the
execution of his powers,

it is only equitable that he should

take the risk of loss.
Frederic C. Woodward.

